The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
复制标题
时钟代理拍卖：实用的组合拍卖设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paul R. Milgrom
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lawrence M. Ausubel;P. Cramton;Paul R. Milgrom
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.
