A public choice framework for controlling transmissible and evolving diseases
A public choice framework for controlling transmissible and evolving diseases
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0906078107
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发表时间：
2010-01-26
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Bergstrom, Carl T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Althouse, Benjamin M.;Bergstrom, Theodore C.;Bergstrom, Carl T.
用来限制传染病传播的控制措施往往会产生外部性。即使在未接种疫苗的人群中，接种传染病疫苗也可以减少疾病的发病率，而抗菌素化疗会导致抗菌素耐药性的演变，从而限制其自身的有效性。我们将公共选择的经济学理论与传染病的数学模型相结合，为在存在这些外部性的情况下做出分配决策提供了一个量化框架。为了说明，我们提供了一系列的例子：破伤风疫苗接种，麻疹疫苗接种，中耳炎的抗生素治疗，以及大流行性流感的抗病毒治疗。
Control measures used to limit the spread of infectious disease often generate externalities. Vaccination for transmissible diseases can reduce the incidence of disease even among the unvaccinated, whereas antimicrobial chemotherapy can lead to the evolution of antimicrobial resistance and thereby limit its own effectiveness over time. We integrate the economic theory of public choice with mathematical models of infectious disease to provide a quantitative framework for making allocation decisions in the presence of these externalities. To illustrate, we present a series of examples: vaccination for tetanus, vaccination for measles, antibiotic treatment of otitis media, and antiviral treatment of pandemic influenza.