Disability Benefits. Consumption Insurance. and Household Labor Supply
Disability Benefits. Consumption Insurance. and Household Labor Supply
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20151231
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发表时间：
2019-07-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Setzler, Bradley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Autor, David;Kostol, Andreas;Setzler, Bradley
没有评估残疾保险（DI）收入对家庭净收入和消费支出、家庭劳动力供应或其他方案福利的影响。结合挪威的详细登记数据与基于随机分配给上诉法官的工具变量方法，我们全面评估了DI接收如何影响这些未充分研究的结果。考虑福利的影响，从这个工具变量的方法的结果，我们估计一个动态的家庭行为模型，就业，再申请，储蓄决策转化为休闲和消费的偏好。基于模型的结果表明，平均而言，支付直接投资收益的意愿是积极的和相当大的。由于配偶的劳动力供应强烈缓冲家庭收入和消费影响的DI津贴，估计愿意支付DI接收已婚比单身申请人。
There is no evaluation of the consequences of Disability Insurance (DI) receipt that captures the effects on households' net income and consumption expenditure, family labor supply, or benefits from other programs. Combining detailed register data from Norway with an instrumental variables approach based on random assignment to appellant judges, we comprehensively assess how DI receipt affects these understudied outcomes. To consider the welfare implications of the findings from this instrumental variables approach, we estimate a dynamic model of household behavior that translates employment, reapplication, and savings decisions into revealed preferences for leisure and consumption. The model-based results suggest that on average, the willingness to pay for DI receipt is positive and sizable. Because spousal labor supply strongly buffers the household income and consumption effects of DI allowances, the estimated willingness to pay for DI receipt is smaller for married than single applicants.