CPS: market analysis of attacks against demand response in the smart grid
CPS: market analysis of attacks against demand response in the smart grid
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CPS：智能电网需求响应攻击的市场分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Mojica
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Barreto;A. Cárdenas;N. Quijano;E. Mojica
需求响应系统假定电力零售市场具有战略电力消费代理。这些系统的目标是设计负载整形机制，以实现资源效率和客户满意度。最近的研究工作研究了完整性攻击在需求响应问题的简化版本中的影响，其中负载消耗代理和对手都不是战略性的。在本文中，我们研究了考虑战略参与者(社会规划者或消费者)和战略攻击者的诚信攻击的影响。我们确定了两种类型的攻击者：(1)想要通过产生突然过载来损坏电网中的设备的恶意攻击者，以及(2)想要通过危害然后操纵控制(负载整形)信号来欺骗系统的自私攻击者。然后，我们探讨两种不同的需求响应系统对这些欺诈者和恶意攻击者的弹性。我们的结果为系统操作员决定要实施哪种类型的需求响应系统、如何保护它们以及检测这些攻击的方向提供了指导。
Demand response systems assume an electricity retail-market with strategic electricity consuming agents. The goal in these systems is to design load shaping mechanisms to achieve efficiency of resources and customer satisfaction. Recent research efforts have studied the impact of integrity attacks in simplified versions of the demand response problem, where neither the load consuming agents nor the adversary are strategic. In this paper, we study the impact of integrity attacks considering strategic players (a social planner or a consumer) and a strategic attacker. We identify two types of attackers: (1) a malicious attacker who wants to damage the equipment in the power grid by producing sudden overloads, and (2) a selfish attacker that wants to defraud the system by compromising and then manipulating control (load shaping) signals. We then explore the resiliency of two different demand response systems to these fraudsters and malicious attackers. Our results provide guidelines for system operators deciding which type of demand-response system they want to implement, how to secure them, and directions for detecting these attacks.