In the Shadows of the Government: Relationship Building During Political Turnovers
In the Shadows of the Government: Relationship Building During Political Turnovers
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DOI：
10.3386/w25300
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发表时间：
2018-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hanming Fang;Zhe Li;Nianhang Xu;Hangjun Yan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hanming Fang;Zhe Li;Nianhang Xu;Hangjun Yan
我们记录到，在中国某个城市的党委书记或市长换届后，总部位于该城市的企业（尤其是私营企业）大幅增加了“福利支出”。基于工具变量的结果和异质性分析都与福利支出用于建立与地方政府关系的解释是一致的。此外，一个城市的地方政治更替往往会伴随着当地政府控制的国有企业董事长或首席执行官的更迭。然而，与地方政府官员有联系的董事长或首席执行官不太可能被替换。
We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially private firms) headquartered in that city significantly increase their "perk spending." Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. Moreover, local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of state-owned firms that are controlled by the local government. However, the Chairmen or CEOs who have connections with local government officials are less likely to be replaced.