The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision☆
The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision☆
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-405x(84)90035-7
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发表时间：
1984-03
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
S. Titman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Titman
一家公司的清算可能会给它的客户、工人和供应商带来成本。这些个人与企业之间存在代理关系，因为企业（作为代理人）控制的清算决定影响其他个人（作为委托人的客户、工人和供应商）。本文的分析表明，资本结构可以通过作为一种前置或约束机制来控制这种关系中的激励/冲突问题。适当的资本结构选择保证激励措施的一致性，使企业实施事前价值最大化的清算政策。
A firm's liquidation can impose costs on its customers, workers, and suppliers. An agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm (as the agent) affects other individuals (the customers, workers, and suppliers as principals). The analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive/conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre-positioning or bonding mechanism. Appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex-ante value-maximizing liquidation policy.