THE GERMAN 4G SPECTRUM AUCTION: DESIGN AND BEHAVIOUR
THE GERMAN 4G SPECTRUM AUCTION: DESIGN AND BEHAVIOUR
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DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12406
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发表时间：
2017-10-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Ockenfels, Axel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cramton, Peter;Ockenfels, Axel
2010年德国4G频谱拍卖是一次不同寻常的大型同时上行多频段拍卖。投标是竞争性的，最后的分配是有效率的。然而，我们的分析表明，独立和理性的竞标者有机会就低收益结果进行隐性协调。但是，协调工作很困难，因为有多个协调中心。一个重要的焦点是拍卖后的谈判，这给竞标者和拍卖商带来了风险。我们分析了不同的竞标场景，以及拍卖后的谈判如何影响价值、竞标和效率。我们还讨论了如何增加同时上升的拍卖形式以减轻风险。
The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyse different bidding scenarios and how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks.