Bayesian Graphical Games for Synchronization in Networks of Dynamical Systems
Bayesian Graphical Games for Synchronization in Networks of Dynamical Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/tcns.2019.2927201
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发表时间：
2020-06
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
V. Lopez;Yan Wan;F. Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
V. Lopez;Yan Wan;F. Lewis
在本文中，微分游戏与不完全信息，或贝叶斯游戏，制定多智能体连续时间动力系统的通信图。这些新的贝叶斯图形游戏模型的情况下，代理人是不确定的，他们的实际回报函数，必须采用从其他代理人的行为观察到的证据，以提高他们的估计，他们的环境的真实的设置。两种不同的解决方案提出了游戏。首先，代理人发挥他们的最佳反应策略方面的政策，他们的邻居，然后，代理人准备自己的最坏情况下的邻居政策。建立了Agent的信念与其分布式控制策略之间的紧密关系。两个信念更新方法提出了代理审查他们的策略，使用从图的拓扑结构获得的信息。
In this paper, differential games with incomplete information, or Bayesian games, are formulated for multiagent continuous-time dynamical systems in a communication graph. These new Bayesian graphical games model the situation where the agents are uncertain about their actual payoff functions and must employ the evidence observed from the behavior of other agents to improve their estimation of the real setting of their environment. Two different solutions are proposed for the game. First, the agents play their best response strategies with respect to the policies of their neighbors; then, the agents prepare themselves for the worst-case neighbor policies. A tight relationship between the beliefs of an agent and its distributed control policy is established. Two belief update methodologies are proposed for the agents to review their strategies using information obtained from the graph topology.