The Philippines Confronts China in the South China Sea: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism
The Philippines Confronts China in the South China Sea: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism
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菲律宾在南海对抗中国：强权政治与自由主义法制主义
DOI：
10.1353/apr.2015.0010
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Renato Cruz de Castro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Renato Cruz de Castro
本文以中国与菲律宾之间的斯卡伯勒浅滩对峙为例，探讨了解决领土争端的两种途径--强权政治和自由主义--法律主义。中国作为一个大国，利用现实政治来推动其在南中国海的扩张主张。菲律宾是一个小国，它采取了自由法律的方式来寻求与中国的平衡。在对峙期间，中国将菲律宾赶出了浅滩，尽管没有发生武装冲突，并实际占领了有争议的地区。作为反措施，菲律宾向国际海洋法法庭提交了一份索赔书。这场对抗是对修昔底德古老格言的考验：“强者做他们有能力做的事，弱者接受他们必须接受的事。”“关键词：南中国海争端、现实主义与自由主义、中国与东南亚关系。修昔底德伯罗奔尼撒战争以来国际关系研究的一个共同前提是，大国在各种冲突中压倒或制服小国。此外，在不对称的冲突中--政治行动者之间能力悬殊的竞争--强者注定会赢，也应该赢（Arregiun-Toft 2005）。因此，小国对世界事务的参与程度较低，可能会发现从事风险和昂贵的外交政策任务（如平衡或随大流）有损于它们的利益。然而，历史表明，大国优势并没有赋予大国将其意志强加于小国的全权。有时候，尽管大国之间存在军事和外交上的差异，但小国也会对大国采取平衡战略，例如，芬兰在1939-1940年对抗苏联，北越在20世纪60年代对抗美国，伊拉克在1991年和2003年再次对抗美国。显然，基于相对权力关系的推论无法解释为什么小国挑战大国，在某些情况下甚至挑起或煽动国际危机或与大国发生武装冲突（Chan，2011）。如果平衡的全球或局部条件成熟，小国可以利用其地缘战略位置对强国施加影响，依靠其他大国的军事援助和安全保障，或者诉诸国际法和国际组织。最后一种方法被认为是最不具强制性的冲突解决方式，它依赖于回报的承诺、说服的力量以及对争端中主张合法性的依赖（Russett和Starr，1996）。小国利用法律的先例和互惠原则，在国际社会面前使自己的主张合法化，使对手的主张非法化，菲律宾就是一个典型的小国挑战21世纪新兴大国中国的例子。面对后者在南海争端中的强权政治手段，阿基诺政府实施了微妙的平衡政策。2011年，它恢复了致力于国内反叛乱的菲律宾武装部队现代化的努力。2011年6月中旬，一位政府高级官员表示，如果争端演变成军事问题，菲律宾可以援引1951年的《菲美共同防御条约》（McIndoe 2011），但阿基诺政府的对华平衡政策是非常危险的。菲律宾没有财力发展哪怕是适度的领土防御能力。此外，这个国家根本无法与一个富裕而军事强大的中国相比。美国在《共同防御条约》下的安全保障程度也存在不确定性。美国奥巴马政府“支持”菲律宾的立场，但似乎态度暧昧，担心引发与中国（美国的主要贸易伙伴）的全面对抗。…
Using the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines as a case study, in this article I examine two approaches to addressing territorial disputes-power politics and liberalism-legalism. China, a major power, uses realpolitik to press its expansive claim in the South China Sea. The Philippines, a small power, adopts the liberal-legal approach that seeks to balance against China. During the standoff, China drove the Philippines out of the shoal, though stopping short of an armed clash, and effected a de facto occupation of the contested area. As a countermeasure, the Philippines filed a statement of claim with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The confrontation was a test of Thucydides's age-old aphorism that "the strong do what they have the power to do, and the weak accept what they have to accept." KEYWORDS: South China Sea dispute, realism and liberalism, China-Southeast Asia relations.A COMMON PREMISE IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War is that big powers overwhelm or subdue small powers in all kinds of conflicts. Furthermore, in an asymmetric conflict-a contention between political actors with a wide disparity in capabilities-the strong are bound to and should win (Arregiun-Toft 2005). Consequently, small powers have a low level of participation in world affairs and might find it detrimental to their interest to engage in risky and expensive foreign policy undertakings such as balancing or bandwagoning.However, history shows that power preponderance does not give big powers carte blanche to impose their will on small powers. Small powers sometimes have applied balancing strategies against the major powers despite the military and diplomatic disparities between them-for example, Finland against the Soviet Union in 1939-1940, North Vietnam against the United States in the 1960s, and Iraq against the United States in 1991 and again in 2003. Clearly, inferences based on relative power relations cannot explain why small powers challenge big powers and in certain cases even provoke or instigate an international crisis or an armed conflict with them (Chan 2011). If global or local conditions for balancing are ripe, small powers can either draw on their geostrategic location to exert leverage on the powerful state, rely on other major powers for military assistance and security guarantees, or appeal to international law and organizations. Considered as the least coercive form of conflict resolution, this last approach banks on a promise of rewards, the power of persuasion, and reliance on the legitimacy of its claims in the dispute (Russett and Starr 1996). The small power uses legal precedent and reciprocity to legitimize its claim and delegitimize the opponent's before the global society.The Philippines is a classic example of a small power challenging an emergent power in the twenty-first century-China. Confronted by the latter's power-politics approach in the South China Sea dispute, the administration of Benigno Aquino implemented a delicate balancing policy. In 2011, it resumed efforts to modernize the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is engrossed in domestic counterinsurgency. In mid-June 2011, a ranking administration official commented that the Philippines could invoke the 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty if the dispute became a military problem (McIndoe 2011).The Aquino administration's balancing policy on China, however, is extremely risky. The Philippines does not have the financial resources to develop even a modest territorial defense capability. Moreover, the country is simply no match for an affluent and militarily powerful China. There is also uncertainty about the extent of the US security guarantee under the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Barack Obama administration "supports" the Philippines's position, but appears noncommittal and wary of triggering an all-out confrontation with China, a major US trading partner. …