College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea
College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea
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非价格竞争的大学招生：韩国的案例
DOI：
10.3386/w20774
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Roth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christopher Avery;Soohyung Lee;A. Roth
这篇论文考察了大学之间的非价格竞争，以吸引高素质的学生，利用韩国政府制定申请规则的环境。我们找出了1994年政策变化前后大学行为的一些基本事实，该政策改变了高考的时间安排，并引入了提前招生，并提出了一个与这些事实相匹配的博弈论模型。当申请披露所有大学都感兴趣的学生信息时，排名较低的大学可以通过限制可能的申请数量，在与排名较高的大学的竞争中获胜。
This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and after a 1994 policy change that changed the timing of the national college entrance exam and introduced early admissions, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches those facts. When applications reveal information about students that is of common interest to all colleges, lower-ranked colleges can gain in competition with higher-ranked colleges by limiting the number of possible applications.