Optimal Pricing Mechanism for Data Market in Blockchain-Enhanced Internet of Things
Optimal Pricing Mechanism for Data Market in Blockchain-Enhanced Internet of Things
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DOI：
10.1109/jiot.2019.2931370
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发表时间：
2019-07
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Kang Liu;Xiaoyu Qiu;Wuhui Chen;Xu Chen;Zibin Zheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kang Liu;Xiaoyu Qiu;Wuhui Chen;Xu Chen;Zibin Zheng
随着物联网（IoT）在大数据时代的快速发展，收集的数据量急剧增加。数据是物联网中最重要的商品之一。为了最大限度地利用收集的数据，设计一个开放的物联网数据市场至关重要，该市场使数据所有者和消费者能够安全有效地进行数据交易。为了解决不可信和不透明的数据市场所带来的安全挑战，我们提出了一个边缘/云计算辅助的、区块链增强的数据市场框架，以支持安全和高效的物联网数据交易，特别关注最佳定价机制。在这种机制中，一个授权的市场代理机构作为一个调度器，确定赢家和它的定价策略，以消费者。我们制定了一个两阶段的Stackelberg游戏来解决数据消费者和市场代理的定价和购买问题。在博弈的第一阶段，市场代理人给出了赢家及其定价策略。在第二阶段，数据消费者决定其购买数据的数量。我们考虑数据所有者之间的竞争，并提出了一个竞争增强的定价方案（CPS）。我们应用逆向归纳法分析了独立和CPS在每个阶段的子博弈完美均衡。最后，我们验证了Stackelberg平衡点的存在唯一性，数值结果表明了CPS的有效性。
With the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) in the era of big data, the amount of collected data has increased dramatically. Data are one of the most important commodities in IoT. To maximize the utility of the collected data, it is crucial to design an open IoT data market that enables data owners and consumers to carry out data trading securely and efficiently. To address the challenge of security presented by an untrusted and nontransparent data market, we propose an edge/cloud-computing-assisted, blockchain-enhanced data market framework to support secure and efficient IoT data trading, with a particular focus on an optimal pricing mechanism. In this mechanism, an authorized market-agency works as a scheduler, determining the win-owner and its pricing strategy to the consumer. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to solve the pricing and purchasing problem of the data consumer and the market-agency. In the first stage of the game, the market-agency gives the win-owner and its pricing strategy. In the second stage, the data consumer decides on its purchasing quantity of data. We consider competition between data owners and propose a competition-enhanced pricing scheme (CPS). We apply backward induction to analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium at each stage for both independent and CPSs. Lastly, we validate the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium, and the numerical results show the efficiency of the CPS.