Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis
Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis
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DOI：
10.1086/689773
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发表时间：
2017-02-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Kesten, Onur
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Yan;Kesten, Onur
中国每年大约有1000万高中毕业生通过中央大学招生系统竞争600万个入学名额。在过去的十年里，许多省份已经从“顺序”机制过渡到“并行”机制来做出录取决定。在本研究中，我们描述了一个参数化的应用拒绝分配机制家族，包括嵌套框架中的顺序、延迟接受和并行机制。我们发现，所有放弃顺序机制的省份都朝着可操控性更低、更稳定的机制发展。我们还表明，现有的经验证据与我们的理论预测是一致的。
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a "sequential" to a "parallel" mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection assignment mechanisms, including the sequential, deferred acceptance, and parallel mechanisms in a nested framework. We show that all of the provinces that have abandoned the sequential mechanism have moved toward less manipulable and more stable mechanisms. We also show that existing empirical evidence is consistent with our theoretical predictions.