THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
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金融发展和资本积累的政治
DOI：
10.1017/s136510051600136x
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
KEIGO NISHIDA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
TARISHI MATSUOKA;KATSUYUKI NAITO;KEIGO NISHIDA
本文认为，金融发展的政治经济学在一个世代重叠的模型，包括信贷市场的不完善性，并表明，收入不平等是金融和经济发展的决定因素。个人有机会以固定成本启动一个投资项目，但他们的收入不平等。政府提出了一项由税收资助的政策，以减轻信贷市场的不完善，其实施是通过多数表决决定的。该政策有利于中等收入个人，他们只有在政策实施后才能开始投资。然而，这项政策违背了富人的利益，他们希望阻止这种新的进入，也违背了穷人的利益，他们希望避免税收负担。这项政策是否获得多数人的支持取决于收入不平等。收入不平等的加剧使政策难以实施，从而导致金融和经济不发达。
This paper considers the political economy of financial development in an overlapping generations model that incorporates credit market imperfections, and shows that income inequality is a determinant of financial and economic development. Individuals have an opportunity to start an investment project at a fixed cost, but their income to finance the cost is unequal. The government proposes a policy financed by taxation that mitigates credit market imperfections, the implementation of which is determined through majority voting. The policy benefits middle-income individuals who can start the investment only after the implementation of the policy. The policy is, however, against the interest of the rich who wish to block such new entry, and that of the poor who wish to avoid the tax burden. Whether the policy obtains majority support depends on income inequality. High income inequality makes the policy hard to implement, which causes financial and economic underdevelopment.