On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions
On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes in Combinatorial Auctions
复制标题
组合拍卖中核心成果的间接和直接实现
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
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通讯作者：
D. Parkes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Parkes
本说明提出了一个部分表征的核心成果实施ascendingproxy组合拍卖，这被证明终止于买方最优核心和买方最优递归核心的解决方案之间的中间的核心点。此外，我们提出了一个简单的变化，总是实现买方最优的核心结果，并实现VCG的回报，每当他们在核心。这保留了有用的鲁棒性托出价和联合偏差，但消除了讨价还价的问题时，代理人是替代品，但较强的买方子模块条件失败。代替一个完整的表征的结果实现的上升代理拍卖，我们引入了一个半直接的实现，运行拍卖作为一个序列的阶段，并可能证明在代理设置与丰富的投标人代理偏好语言特别有用。最后，我们提出了一些直接实现买方最优的核心成果，并希望开始讨论适当的选择标准。这是很重要的环境中，代理人未能解决讨价还价的问题，这是隐含在核心的结果时，VCG的回报是在核心之外，在他们之间。
This note presents a partial characterization of the core outcome implemented in the ascendingproxy combinatorial auction, which is demonstrated to terminate at a core point intermediate between buyer-optimal core and buyer-optimal recursive-core solutions. In addition, we propose a simple variation to ascending-proxy that always implements a buyer-optimal core outcome and implements the VCG payoffs whenever they are in the core. This retains the useful robustness to shill bids and joint deviations, but removes the bargaining problem when agents-are-substitutes but the stronger buyer-submodular condition fails. In lieu of a complete characterization of the outcome implemented by the ascending-proxy auction we do introduce a semi-direct implementation that runs the auction as a sequence of stages and may prove particularly useful in proxy settings with rich bidder-proxy preference languages. Finally, we present a number of direct implementations of buyer-optimal core outcomes, and hope to start a debate about appropriate selection criteria. This is important in environments in which agents fail to solve the bargaining problem, which is implicit in the core outcome when VCG payoffs are outside the core, amongst themselves.