Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage
Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage
复制标题
监管、垂直整合和破坏
DOI：
10.1111/1467-6451.00152
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Mayo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Beard;D. Kaserman;J. Mayo
我们考虑了一家主导企业的动机，该企业为伯川德竞争的差异化产品下游行业提供了必要的投入：(1)纵向整合，(2)通过非价格活动提高下游竞争对手的成本，我们通常将其描述为“破坏”。我们在没有和存在对上游价格的监管约束的情况下审查了这些激励措施。我们发现，尽管无论是否存在监管约束，垂直一体化的激励都是存在的，但破坏的激励只有在存在约束性投入价格监管的情况下才会出现。此外，还探讨了福利效应。布莱克韦尔出版有限公司版权所有2001年
We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise its downstream rivals' costs through non-price activities which we characterize generally as "sabotage". We examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price. We find that, while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint, the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation. Welfare effects are also explored. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd