Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing
Drones in Distress: A Game-Theoretic Countermeasure for Protecting UAVs Against GPS Spoofing
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DOI：
10.1109/jiot.2019.2963337
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发表时间：
2020-04-01
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Saad, Walid
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Eldosouky, AbdelRahman;Ferdowsi, Aidin;Saad, Walid
针对无人机 (UAV) 的一项突出安全威胁是通过全球定位系统 (GPS) 欺骗进行捕获，其中攻击者操纵无人机的 GPS 信号以捕获它。鉴于无人机预计将广泛部署用于各种目的，因此必须开发新的安全解决方案来应对此类攻击。本文介绍了一个数学框架，用于分析和减轻 GPS 欺骗攻击对无人机的影响。特别是，系统动力学用于对无人机到达目的地的最佳路线进行建模。该模型还捕获了 GPS 欺骗器对每架无人机路线的影响。为此，通过分析得出欺骗者在无人机上的最佳施加位置；允许无人机预测受到攻击的行驶路线。然后，开发了一种对策机制来减轻 GPS 欺骗攻击的影响。该对策建立在合作定位的前提下，其中无人机可以使用附近的无人机而不是可能受损的 GPS 位置来确定其位置。为了更好地利用所提出的防御机制，制定了动态 Stackelberg 游戏来模拟 GPS 欺骗者和无人机操作员之间的交互。特别是，无人机操作员充当领导者，根据欺骗者的预期响应策略确定其最佳策略。然后通过一种新颖的算法对博弈的均衡策略进行分析和研究。仿真结果表明，当与Stackelberg策略相结合时，所提出的防御机制在降低无人机捕获可能性方面将优于基线策略选择技术。
One prominent security threat that targets unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the capture via global positioning system (GPS) spoofing in which an attacker manipulates a UAV's GPS signals in order to capture it. Given the anticipated widespread deployment of UAVs for various purposes, it is imperative to develop new security solutions against such attacks. In this article, a mathematical framework is introduced for analyzing and mitigating the effects of GPS spoofing attacks on UAVs. In particular, system dynamics are used to model the optimal routes that the UAVs will adopt to reach their destinations. The GPS spoofer's effect on each UAV's route is also captured by the model. To this end, the spoofer's optimal imposed locations on the UAVs, are analytically derived; allowing the UAVs to predict their traveling routes under attack. Then, a countermeasure mechanism is developed to mitigate the effect of the GPS spoofing attack. The countermeasure is built on the premise of cooperative localization, in which a UAV can determine its location using nearby UAVs instead of the possibly compromised GPS locations. To better utilize the proposed defense mechanism, a dynamic Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions between a GPS spoofer and a drone operator. In particular, the drone operator acts as the leader that determines its optimal strategy in light of the spoofer's expected response strategy. The equilibrium strategies of the game are then analytically characterized and studied through a novel proposed algorithm. The simulation results show that, when combined with the Stackelberg strategies, the proposed defense mechanism will outperform baseline strategy selection techniques in terms of reducing the possibility of UAV capture.