Examining the impact of website take-down on phishing
Examining the impact of website take-down on phishing
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DOI：
10.1145/1299015.1299016
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发表时间：
2007-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Moore;R. Clayton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Moore;R. Clayton
银行和其他组织处理欺诈性网络钓鱼网站的方式是向托管服务提供商施压，要求他们将这些网站从互联网上删除。在它们被删除之前，欺诈者会了解被骗访问它们的用户的密码、个人识别号码（pin）和其他个人详细信息。我们分析了网络钓鱼网站删除时间和网站吸引的访问者数量的经验数据，得出结论：网站删除是解决网络钓鱼问题的一部分，但速度不够快，无法完全缓解问题。删除时间很好地符合对数正态分布，但在一般模式中，有充分的证据表明，一些服务提供商在删除网站方面比其他服务提供商更快，一些品牌可以更快地删除欺诈性网站。我们特别研究了网络钓鱼网站的一个主要子集（由“岩石网络钓鱼”团伙运营），这些网站约占所有网络钓鱼活动的一半，其架构创新延长了它们的平均寿命。最后，我们对我们观察到的网络钓鱼网站给银行业造成的总损失提供了一个大概的估计。
Banks and other organisations deal with fraudulent phishing websites by pressing hosting service providers to remove the sites from the Internet. Until they are removed, the fraudsters learn the passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs) and other personal details of the users who are fooled into visiting them. We analyse empirical data on phishing website removal times and the number of visitors that the websites attract, and conclude that website removal is part of the answer to phishing, but it is not fast enough to completely mitigate the problem. The removal times have a good fit to a lognormal distribution, but within the general pattern there is ample evidence that some service providers are faster than others at removing sites, and that some brands can get fraudulent sites removed more quickly. We particularly examine a major subset of phishing websites (operated by the 'rock-phish' gang) which accounts for around half of all phishing activity and whose architectural innovations have extended their average lifetime. Finally, we provide a ballpark estimate of the total loss being suffered by the banking sector from the phishing websites we observed.