Public Expenditure Interactions of Chinese Local Governments: A Simultaneous Equations Network Approach
Public Expenditure Interactions of Chinese Local Governments: A Simultaneous Equations Network Approach
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DOI：
10.1080/1540496x.2016.1267004
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发表时间：
2017-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
J. Lei;Yanbin Chen;Junxue Jia;Kai Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Lei;Yanbin Chen;Junxue Jia;Kai Liu
摘要地方政府之间的财政竞争、财政模仿和财政互动是一个复杂的网络。为了更好地模拟和估计中国地方政府公共支出的相互作用，本文采用联立方程网络方法，考虑了地方政府公共支出多个组成部分的空间依赖性和同一城市内不同组成部分之间的内部竞争。利用中国县级财政数据发现，中国地方政府基本建设支出的内生同行效应为正，基本建设支出与行政支出是互补而非替代，不存在对社会福利支出的财政模仿，行政支出对社会福利支出存在较强的挤出效应。
ABSTRACT Fiscal competition, mimicking, and interactions among local governments exist as a complex network. To better model and estimate public expenditure interactions of Chinese local governments, we adopt a simultaneous equations network approach in which spatial dependence of multiple components of local governments’ spending and also the internal competition among different components of public expenditure within the same city are considered. Using Chinese county-level fiscal data, we find that the endogenous peer effect for capital construction expenditure is positive among Chinese local governments, capital construction expenditure and administrative expenditure are complements rather than substitutes, there is no fiscal mimicking of social welfare expenditure, and there is a strong crowd-out effect of administrative expenditure on social welfare spending.