The Flint Water Crisis Confirms That US Drinking Water Needs Improved Risk Management
The Flint Water Crisis Confirms That US Drinking Water Needs Improved Risk Management
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DOI：
10.1021/acs.est.6b02238
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发表时间：
2016-06-07
影响因子：
11.4
通讯作者：
Hrudey, Steve
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Baum, Rachel;Bartram, Jamie;Hrudey, Steve
这些美国人不仅仅有弗林特最近发生的事件来支持他们的信仰。在弗林特水危机之前是托莱多水危机，在托莱多之前是西弗吉尼亚水危机，在那之前......这份清单还在继续，表明存在更大的公共卫生问题，而目前的监管体系一再未能解决这些问题，以保护美国居民。那我们该怎么办？最有可能的是，联邦和州的调查将准确地找出谁应该受到指责，并将以令人痛苦的精确度记录这种故障是如何发生的，但不会实施预防性风险管理。这一调查过程是必要的，但还不够。那些受影响的人不会更好。根据最大污染物水平（MCL）对处理后的水质进行监测，无论多么严格，都是一种固有的反应方法。有效的风险管理必须从根本上预防风险。对供水系统故障进行了广泛的分析，得出的结论是，如果有更好的风险管理，大多数故障都是可以预防的。[1]然而，大多数公用事业公司都不愿意采取任何超出监管要求精确限制的预防措施，因为监管要求已经被视为繁重。最近的研究表明，报告最多的原因是由于时间和金钱的限制，但这些也可能反映了公用事业和监管机构缺乏政策优先权。2美国公共饮用水系统专注于满足针对某些MCL和特定处理技术的国家规定的法规。虽然这些法规可以帮助减少污染物引起的水传播疾病的风险，但不同的供水设施面临不同的风险，在美国这样一个水文多样性的国家，同样适用于所有系统的标准监测不可避免地对某些系统提出了不必要的监测要求，但无法想象能捕捉到影响每个案例的特定危害。例如，在托莱多，2014年，当反复出现的藻华产生有毒的微囊藻毒素进入饮用水系统时，自来水公司关闭了3天的分配，以防止因暴露于自然产生的剧毒污染物而引起的疾病。微囊藻毒素目前不受美国环境保护署（USEPA）的监管，因此可以在不受监测的情况下进入饮用水系统。潜在的微囊藻毒素危害是否已经被预期为营养丰富的地表水供应，已知经历问题藻华？是的基于事先认识到潜在危险的早期反应是否会导致更早和更有效的反应？很可能是这样，改善风险管理涉及改善个别公用事业的具体地点风险评估，以便最有能力应对的人了解他们面临的可能风险以及他们的系统管理这些风险的能力。一般性的国家要求在功能上不如具体地点的知识有效。风险管理方法，如水安全计划（WSP），促进对个别公用事业风险的评估，以便实施适当的控制，改进和监测计划。这种基于过程的、了解自己系统的方法改变了文化，从对危险事件的发生作出反应转变为完全防止危险事件的发生。在试图应用统一控制时，美国现行法规冒着对污染物进行不必要监测的风险，同时忽视了当地的关键风险。一年365天每天24公顷提供安全、高质量的饮用水是一项知识密集型工作。监管需要促进相关知识的产生，而不是...
These Americans have more than just the recent events in Flint to support their beliefs. Before the Flint water crisis was the Toledo water crisis and before Toledo was the West Virginia water crisis and before that... The list goes on and shows the existence of larger public health concerns that the current regulatory system has repeatedly failed to address to protect US residents. So what will be done about it? Most likely, federal and state investigations will figure out exactly who to blame and will document with agonizing precision how such a failure occurred, but no preventive risk management will be implemented. This investigative process is necessary but insufficient. Those affected will be no better off. Monitoring of treated water quality against maximum contaminant levels (MCLs), no matter how stringent, is an inherently reactive approach. Effective risk management needs to be fundamentally preventive. Water system failures have been extensively analyzed, leading to a conclusion that most could have been prevented with better risk management. 1 However, most utilities are reluctant to embrace any preventive measures beyond the precise limits of regulatory requirements that are already viewed as being onerous. Recent research shows the most reported reasons to be because of time and money constraints, but these may also reflect a lack of policy priority shared by the utility and regulator. 2 US public drinking water systems are focused on meeting nationally defined regulations that target certain MCLs and specific treatment techniques. While these regulations can help to reduce the risk of waterborne illness from contaminants, different water utilities experience different risks, and in a country as hydrologically diverse as the US, standard monitoring equally applied to all systems inevitably imposes unnecessary monitoring demands on some yet cannot conceivably catch the specific hazards affecting every case. For example, in Toledo, in 2014, when the recurring algal blooms produced toxic microcystin that entered the drinking water system, the water utility shut down distribution for 3 days to prevent illness caused by exposure to a naturally produced, very toxic contaminant. Microcystin is not currently regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and so can enter drinking water systems without being monitored. Could the potential microcystin hazard have been anticipated for a nutrient-rich surface water supply known to experience problem algal blooms? Yes. Would earlier response based on prior recognition of the potential hazard have led to an earlier and more effective response? Likely so.Improving risk management involves improving site-specific risk assessments at individual utilities so that those best placed to respond will know the plausible risks they face and the capabilities of their systems to manage those risks. Generic national requirements will not be as functionally effective as site-specific knowledge. Risk management approaches, such as water safety plans (WSPs), promote the assessment of individual utility risks so that appropriate controls, improvements, and monitoring plans can be implemented. This process-based, know-your-own-system approach changes the culture from one of reacting to hazardous events as they occur to preventing their occurrence altogether. In attempting to apply uniform controls, current US regulations run the risk of unnecessary monitoring of contaminants, while overlooking locally critical risks. Providing safe, high quality drinking water 24 ha day, 365 days a year is a knowledge-intensive undertaking. Regulation needs to promote relevant knowledge-generation rather than …