Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation
Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation
复制标题
非线性定价和价格上限监管
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)01466-2
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
J. Vickers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mark Amrstong;Simon Cowan;J. Vickers
本文分析了在价格上限管制下，企业利润最大化的非线性定价问题。两种形式的监管约束被认为是：（一）对公司的平均收入的上限，（二）约束，该公司必须继续为每个消费者提供购买的选择在统一的价格。在这些制度的最优非线性价格表被证明有简单的特征，与非线性关税，不受管制的垄断者将收取。在所有的管制制度中，厂商偏好平均收益约束而非选择权约束，且最不喜欢统一定价。总体而言，消费者更喜欢期权制度，而不是统一定价，并且最不喜欢平均收入约束，但消费者之间也存在分配效应。虽然可选的关税制度帕累托主导统一定价，它是模糊的福利更高的统一定价或平均收入制度。最后通过一个例子说明了模糊性的本质。
This paper analyzes profit-maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation. Two forms of regulatory constraint are considered: (i) a cap on the firm's average revenue, and (ii) a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price. Optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge. Of the regulatory regimes, the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least. Consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least, but there are also distributional effects between consumers. Although the optional tariff regime Pareto dominates uniform pricing, it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime. An example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity.