A novel design-for-security (DFS) architecture to prevent unauthorized IC overproduction
A novel design-for-security (DFS) architecture to prevent unauthorized IC overproduction
复制标题
一种新颖的安全设计 (DFS) 架构，可防止未经授权的 IC 过量生产
DOI：
10.1109/vts.2017.7928946
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Singh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ujjwal Guin;Ziqi Zhou;A. Singh
由于半导体制造成本高昂，大多数片上系统 (SoC) 设计公司将其生产外包给离岸代工厂。不受信任的代工厂可以违反合同制造和销售额外的未经授权的芯片以获取利润。这种生产过剩不仅会给设计者带来巨大的收入损失，而且在敏感设计的情况下还可能对国家安全产生影响。多年来，研究人员通过修改底层功能提出了不同的设计混淆技术，以防止未经授权的芯片过量生产。不受信任的代工厂/组装厂不能出售芯片，除非它们被激活。芯片只有在用密钥激活时才能正常工作，而密钥需要对任何对手保密。然而，基于布尔可满足性 (SAT) 的算法已证明可以有效地破解基于密钥的混淆方法。在本文中，我们提出了一种新颖的安全单元设计，用于实现安全设计（DFS）基础设施，以防止在任何情况下将密钥泄露给对手。重要的是，我们的设计不会以任何方式限制芯片的可测试性，包括硅后验证和调试。
Due to the prohibitive costs of semiconductor manufacturing, most system-on-chip (SoC) design companies outsource their production to offshore foundries. An untrusted foundry can manufacture and sell additional unauthorized chips for profit in violation of their contract. This overproduction can not only cause significant loss of revenue to the designer, but may also have national security implications in case of sensitive designs. Over the years, researchers have proposed different design obfuscation techniques by modifying the underlying functionality to prevent this unauthorized overproduction of chips. An untrusted foundry/assembly cannot sell chips unless they are activated. A chip works properly only when it is activated with a key, which needs to be kept secret from any adversary. However, Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based algorithms have shown to efficiently break key based obfuscation methods. In this paper, we present a novel secure cell design for implementing design-for-security (DFS) infrastructure to prevent of leaking the key to an adversary under any circumstances. Importantly, our design does not limit the testability of the chip in any way, including post-silicon validation and debug.