Generalized Nash Equilibrium with Stable Belief Hierarchies in Static Games with Unawareness
Generalized Nash Equilibrium with Stable Belief Hierarchies in Static Games with Unawareness
复制标题
无意识静态博弈中具有稳定信念层次的广义纳什均衡
DOI：
10.1007/s10479-016-2266-5
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Yasuo Sasaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuuki Ogihara;Tomoyuki Masuda;Shigeru Ozaki;Masaaki Yoshikawa;Takashi Shiga;Toru Kobayashi;Yasuo Sasaki
在博弈论中，最近发展了无意识对策的模型和解的概念。以无意识静态博弈为研究对象，讨论了广义纳什均衡这一已有的均衡概念。一些广义的纳什均衡可能是不稳定的，因为一旦玩到了均衡，一些代理人的信念就会在某人的感知层次结构的某个层面上被证伪。在此基础上，我们刻画了一类表示稳定信念层次的广义纳什均衡，使其能够避免这样的问题。这类均衡可以作为游戏的稳定惯例来激励。我们还研究了无意识如何影响代理在静止状态下的行为。
In game theory, recently models and solution concepts of games with unawareness have been developed. Focusing on static games with unawareness, this paper discusses generalized Nash equilibrium, an existing equilibrium concept. Some generalized Nash equilibria can be unstable in the sense that, once an equilibrium is played, some agent’s belief is falsified at some level of someone’s perception hierarchy. Based on the observation, we characterize a particular class of generalized Nash equilibrium that expresses stable belief hierarchies so that it can avoid such a problem. This class of equilibrium can be motivated as a stable convention of the game. We also study how unawareness can affect the agents’ behaviors in a stationary state.