The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century
The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century
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金融监管的政治经济学：来自 19 世纪美国各州高利贷法的证据
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01560.x
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Efraim Benmelech
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tobias J. Moskowitz;Efraim Benmelech
我们通过研究 19 世纪美国各州高利贷法律的政治经济学来调查金融监管的原因和后果。我们发现有证据表明高利贷法具有约束力并得到执行，而且贷款活动受到利率上限的影响。利用各州和时间在监管、执法和市场条件方面的异质性，我们发现，当监管成本较低且与排除某些群体的其他经济和政治限制共存时，监管就会收紧。此外，有利于某一群体（并限制其他群体）的金融监管决定因素与更高（更低）的未来经济增长率相关。有证据表明，监管是私人利益利用国家强制力从其他群体榨取租金的结果，凸显了金融发展和增长的内生性。
We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth.