Wildlife trade, sanctions and compliance: lessons from the CITES regime
Wildlife trade, sanctions and compliance: lessons from the CITES regime
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00576.x
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Reeve, Rosalind
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Reeve, Rosalind
国际社会拥有一个强有力的工具来控制野生动物贸易-濒危野生植物群种国际贸易公约（CITES）。20多年来，它一直将贸易制裁作为一个独特的合规制度的基石，该制度是通过实践和次级规则演变而来的。本文讨论了实施制裁的机制，并评估了其有效性。《濒危物种贸易公约》的遵约制度在很大程度上是在与其他环境条约隔绝的情况下发展起来的，但其他正在制定机制以处理不遵约问题的贸易相关协定可以吸取一些经验教训。由于缺乏支持能力建设的资金，《濒危物种贸易公约》特别依赖基于制裁的办法。文章通过国家立法项目说明了用于支持技术援助的制裁如何能够间接建设执行条约的能力。报告最后指出，目前正在谈判的遵约准则有可能破坏《濒危物种公约》的遵约制度，并侵蚀过去三十年的成果。
The international community possesses a powerful tool to control wildlife trade-the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). For over 20 years it has used trade sanctions as the cornerstone of a unique compliance system that has evolved through practice and secondary rules. This article discusses the mechanisms through which sanctions are imposed and assesses their effectiveness. The CITES compliance system has evolved largely in isolation from other environmental treaties, yet there are lessons that could be learned by other trade-related agreements that are in the process of developing their mechanisms to address non-compliance. CITES is particularly dependent on a sanctions-based approach because of the lack of funds to support capacity building. The article demonstrates through the national legislation project how sanctions used to back-up technical assistance can indirectly build capacity to implement the treaty. It concludes by arguing that guidelines on compliance currently under negotiation risk undermining the CITES compliance system and eroding the gains of the last three decades.