Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
Controlling excludability in the evolution of cooperation
复制标题
控制合作演变中的排他性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
I. Gordo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Dionísio;I. Gordo
背景：如果个人不能保护自己未来对可耗尽资源的使用，就会发生公地悲剧，如果个人以超出可持续性的速度开发资源，个人的健康状况就会增加。自然选择然后迫使个体减少，甚至摧毁他们的资源。保护未来使用的一种方法是私有化--即在当地将竞争对手排除在资源之外。另一种是通过限制剥削率来减少个人之间的竞争。问题：在什么情况下，自然选择会增加排斥性？如果个人之间的关联性很高，亲属选择是否足以消除或削弱私有化的演变？数学方法：我们使用一个简单的模型来捕捉个人和团队成功之间的紧张关系。然后，我们使用进化博弈论的标准优化技术来计算进化稳定策略。结论：选择私有化是在关联度低的情况下进行的。发生这种情况的条件类似于以前为减少竞争而获得的条件，因为损害的非排他性，而不是竞争本身，是公地悲剧的根本原因。
Background: A tragedy of the commons arises if individuals cannot protect their future use of a depletable resource, and individual fitness increases if individuals exploit the resource at rates beyond sustainability. Natural selection then forces the individuals to diminish, perhaps even to destroy, their resource. One way to protect future use is privatization – that is, locally excluding rivals from the resource. Another is to reduce rivalry among individuals by restricting exploitation rates. Questions: Under what conditions will natural selection increase excludability? If relatedness among individuals is high, will kin selection be enough to eliminate or weaken the evolution of privatization? Mathematical method: We use a simple model that captures the tension between individual and group success. Then, we calculate the evolutionarily stable strategy using the standard optimization techniques of evolutionary game theory. Conclusions: Selection for privatization occurs at low values of relatedness. The conditions for this to occur resemble those previously obtained for the reduction of rivalry because non-excludability of damage, and not rivalry per se, is the fundamental cause of the tragedy of the commons.