Strategic manipulation in group decisions with pairwise comparisons: A game theoretical perspective
Strategic manipulation in group decisions with pairwise comparisons: A game theoretical perspective
复制标题
成对比较群体决策中的策略操纵：博弈论视角
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.015
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Sasaki Yasuo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sang Haixia;Takahashi Shingo;Mari Ito and Masaaki Suzuki;Sasaki Yasuo
我们讨论了群体决策中的策略操纵问题，通过两两比较。两两比较在层次分析法（AHP）中起着举足轻重的作用。虽然有大量的文献将其应用到群体决策中，但很少有人关注策略问题：策略不诚实的个体可能会使群体决策产生偏差。我们的目标是提请注意的问题，并提供一个正式的角度来处理它。我们考虑的情况下，群体决策的输入是个人的成对偏好和结果是在他们的利益。我们将这种情况描述为一个战略游戏，其中个人决定如何提交他们的成对偏好。理论结果表明，真实报道仅在非常有限的情况下才能成为优势策略，而且往往是弱优势的。
We discuss the issue of strategic manipulation in group decision-making via pairwise comparisons. Pairwise comparisons play a pivotal role in the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Although there is a large amount of literature on its application to group decisions, very little attention has been paid to the strategic issue: a group decision can be biased by strategically dishonest individuals. We aim to draw attention to the problem and provide a formal perspective to deal with it. We consider a scenario of group decision-making where the inputs are the individuals’ pairwise preferences and the outcome is in their interest. We formulate this situation as a strategic game where the individuals decide how to submit their pairwise preferences. Theoretical results show that truthful reporting can be a dominant strategy only in very limited situations, and moreover it is often weakly dominated.