How do individuals behave in the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? A strategy method experiment
How do individuals behave in the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? A strategy method experiment
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在代际可持续发展困境中，个人如何表现？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tatsuyoshi Saijo
中科院分区：
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作者：
Mostafa E. Shahen;Koji Kotani;Tatsuyoshi Saijo
代际可持续发展困境（ISD）是指当代人选择最大化（牺牲）自己的利益而不考虑子孙后代、损害（维持）代际可持续发展（IS）的情况（Kamijo等人，2017年，Shahrier等人，2017年b）。尽管它的重要性，鲜为人知的是，个人如何表现下的ISD和影响IS。我们设计了一个人的ISD游戏（ISDG）的策略方法，其中一个队列的个人被组织为一代序列。每个人都被要求在36种情况下选择：（i）一个不可持续的选项，它产生的收益X，对后代来说是不可逆转的成本D，或者（ii）一个可持续的选项，它产生的收益（X-D），对后代来说是不可逆转的成本;在每种情况下，前几代人选择的历史和X & D的收益结构都是不同的。作为ISD的一个潜在解决方案，我们建立了一个未来的前后（FAB）机制，其中每个人都被要求，首先，采取下一代的立场，并要求她希望当前一代选择什么，其次，从原来的位置做出实际决定。我们的研究结果表明，当前几代人选择不可持续选项的比例很高或当X/D（IS指数）很低时，个人可能会选择不可持续选项。然而，FAB治疗可以有效地防止个人在这种情况下选择不可持续的选择。总体而言，结果表明，一些新的制度，如FAB机制，诱导人们采取的立场，未来几代人，可能是必要的，以避免代际不可持续性，特别是当IS违约风险变得很高。
The intergenerational sustainability dilemma (ISD) is a situation where the current generation chooses to maximize (sacrifice) its own benefits without (for) considering future generations, compromising (maintaining) intergenerational sustainability (IS) (Kamijo et al., 2017, Shahrier et al., 2017b). Despite its importance, little is known about how individuals behave under the ISD and affect IS.We design a one-person ISD game (ISDG) with a strategy method in which a queue of individuals is organized as a generational sequence. Each individual is asked to choose, in 36 situations, either (i) an unsustainable option that yields a payoff, X, at an irreversible cost to future generations, D, or (ii) a sustainable option that yields a payoff, (X - D), that imposes no cost on future generations; in each situation, the histories of previous generations’ choices and the payoff structures of X & D are varied. As a potential resolution for the ISD, we institute a future ahead and back (FAB) mechanism, whereby each individual is asked, first, to take the position of the next generation and request what she wants the current generation to choose and, second, to make the actual decision from the original position. Our results show that individuals are likely to choose the unsustainable option when the proportion of previous generations that chose the unsustainable option is high or when X/D (the IS index) is low. However, the FAB treatment is effective at preventing individuals from choosing the unsustainable option even in such situations. Overall, the results suggest that some new institutions, such as FAB mechanisms, which induce people to take the standpoint of future generations, may be necessary to avoid intergenerational unsustainability, especially when IS default risk becomes high.