The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination
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阿罗式社会选择与提名过程的可能性
DOI：
10.1007/s11238-016-9547-y
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Yukinori Iwata
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Xu Haifeng;Namba Akio;Akio Namba and Kazuhiro Ohtani;難波明生;Akio Namba;Akio Namba;Namba Akio;Akio Namba;Akio Namba;Yukinori Iwata
本文引入了一个具有提名过程的阿罗维社会选择框架。我们考虑了一个两阶段的社会选择过程，在这个过程中，首先通过汇总提名者的意见来提名一些备选方案，然后社会通过汇总选民的偏好从被提名的备选方案中做出集体选择。对于每个备选方案是否有资格进行集体决策，每个提名者的意见是积极的、消极的或中立的。如果一个选民是提名人，他的偏好空间受到他的意见的限制，他总是喜欢积极的选择而不是中性的选择，中性的选择而不是消极的选择。当每个提名选民都有这样的偏好空间时，我们首先在社会选择框架的第二阶段描述了rowconsistent偏好域。其次，我们找到了阿罗不可能性定理在至少一个提名投票人存在时的解。
In this paper, we introduce an Arrovian social choice framework with the process of nomination. We consider a two-stage social choice procedure in which some alternatives are first nominated by aggregating the opinions ofnominators, and then the society makes a collective choice from the nominated alternatives by aggregating the preferences of voters. Each nominator’s opinion is a positive, negative, or neutral view as to whether each alternative deserves to be eligible for collective decision making. If a voter is a nominator, his preference space is restricted by his opinion as follows: he always prefers positive alternatives to neutral ones and neutral alternatives to negative ones, according to his opinion. When each nominating voter has such a preference space, we first characterizeArrow-consistentpreference domains at the second stage of the social choice framework. Second, we find a resolution of Arrow’s impossibility theorem when at least one nominating voter exists.