Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration
Externalities vs internalities: a model of political integration
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DOI：
10.1016/s0047-2727(97)00090-x
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发表时间：
1998-05-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Ellingsen, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ellingsen, T
分权政府导致了区域间的外部性。综合管辖权解决了外部性问题，而中央集权政府则带来了其他成本尤其是对少数人利益的忽视。本文正式模型之间的权衡，这两种力量在确定最佳以及司法管辖区的均衡设计。区域的相对大小和口味的分布被证明是问题的重要参数。(C)1998年Elsevier Science S.A.
Decentralized government leads to inter-regional externalities. Whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem, centralized government entails other costs-in particular a neglect for minority interests. The paper models formally the trade-off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions. Both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.