Self Control and Commitment: Can Decreasing the Liquidity of a Savings Account Increase Deposits?
Self Control and Commitment: Can Decreasing the Liquidity of a Savings Account Increase Deposits?
复制标题
自我控制和承诺：减少储蓄账户的流动性可以增加存款吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sakong Jung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Beshears;James J. Choi;C. Harris;David Laibson;B. Madrian;Sakong Jung
如果个人有自我控制问题，他们可能会采取承诺合同，限制他们的支出。我们的实验研究合同设计如何影响承诺合同的需求。每个参与者将资金分配给一个流动账户和一个承诺账户，流动账户允许无限制的提款，承诺账户的提款限制在参与者之间是随机的。当两个账户支付相同的利率时，流动性最差的承诺账户比其他任何承诺账户吸引更多的资金。我们从理论上表明，这种模式是一致的存在复杂的存在偏见的代理人，谁喜欢更多的非流动性承诺帐户，即使他们受到不可保的边际效用冲击，从广泛的一类分布。当承诺账户支付比流动账户更高的利率时，流动性不足和存款之间的关系是平坦的，这表明在我们的样本中也存在没有当前偏差和/或天真的当前偏差的代理人。
If individuals have self-control problems, they may take up commitment contracts that restrict their spending. We experimentally investigate how contract design affects the demand for commitment contracts. Each participant divides money between a liquid account, which permits unrestricted withdrawals, and a commitment account with withdrawal restrictions that are randomized across participants. When the two accounts pay the same interest rate, the most illiquid commitment account attracts more money than any of the other commitment accounts. We show theoretically that this pattern is consistent with the presence of sophisticated present-biased agents, who prefer more illiquid commitment accounts even if they are subject to uninsurable marginal utility shocks drawn from a broad class of distributions. When the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the relationship between illiquidity and deposits is flat, suggesting that agents without present bias and/or naive present-biased agents are also present in our sample.