Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition
Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition
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在不对称税收竞争模式下加强合作
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ruud A. De Mooij
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Vrijburg;Ruud A. De Mooij
本文分析了国家规模不同的三国税收竞争模型中的公司税收强化合作协议。我们描述了均衡税率和由于加强合作协议的形成而产生的最优税收反应。税率具有战略互补性或战略可替代性的条件，对于加强合作的福利效果至关重要。模拟表明，加强合作对小国来说不太可能可行。如果加强合作是可行的，它可能会妨碍全球协调。只有在国家规模相近的情况下，全球协调才是可行的结果。
This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome.