Unbundling Institutions for External Finance: Worldwide Firm-Level Evidence
Unbundling Institutions for External Finance: Worldwide Firm-Level Evidence
复制标题
外部融资机构的分拆：全球企业层面的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.02.003
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Xu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stephen F. Knack;L. Xu
关于制度的文献受到了挑战，理由是反向因果关系、制度指标的测量误差和异质性。这篇白皮书使用了跨国家的公司级数据来应对这些挑战。我们侧重于对公司一级外部融资的影响，以及Acemoglu和Johnson(2005)意义上的“非捆绑”机构，同时解决了机构指标中的衡量误差这一被普遍忽视的问题。我们发现，促进私人交易的合同制度对企业获得外部融资的影响很小。相比之下，约束政治和经济精英的产权制度与获得外部融资表现出强烈的正向联系。有趣的是，就营运资本而言，产权制度与外部融资之间的关联性往往强于投资。我们的结果表明，机构，特别是产权机构影响发展的一个重要渠道是通过获得外部资金。
The literature on institutions has been challenged on grounds of reverse causality, measurement error in institutional indicators, and heterogeneity. This paper uses firm-level data across countries to confront these challenges. We focus on the effect on firm-level external finance, and “unbundle” institutions in the sense of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), while addressing the largely-ignored issue of measurement error in institutional indicators. We find that contracting institutions that facilitate transactions between private parties exert little effect on firms' access to external finance. In contrast, property rights institutions that constrain political and economic elites exhibit a strong positive association with access to external finance. Interestingly, the association between property rights institutions and external finance tends to be stronger for working capital than for investment. Our results suggest that an important channel for institutions and especially property right institutions to affect development is through access to external finance.