A Strategic Implementation of the Shapley Value for the Nested Cost-Sharing Problem
A Strategic Implementation of the Shapley Value for the Nested Cost-Sharing Problem
复制标题
嵌套成本分摊问题的 Shapley 值的策略实现
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12190
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Chun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Chun;Cheng;Chun
当代理商对公共设施有不同的需求，但是为给定代理服务允许为所有需求的代理服务比他的额外费用更小的代理服务时，代理商应如何将设施的成本分配给他们之间？我们为这类成本分担问题提供了沙普利价值的战略实施。我们介绍了一个三阶段的广泛表格游戏，该游戏尊重个人理性，并表明该游戏中只有一个并且只有一个体面的平衡结果。此外，这是由沙普利价值分配的分配。
When agents have different needs for a public facility but serving a given agent allows serving all agents with smaller needs than his without any extra cost, how should the agents divide the cost of the facility among themselves? We provide a strategic implementation of the Shapley value for this class of cost-sharing problems. We introduce a three-stage extensive form game that respects individual rationality and show that there is one and only one subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. Moreover, it is the allocation assigned by the Shapley value.