Endogenous FDI Spillovers: Do You Want to Keep Your Recipe to Yourself?
Endogenous FDI Spillovers: Do You Want to Keep Your Recipe to Yourself?
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
K. Matsubara
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作者：
K. Matsubara
本文旨在探讨双寡头模式下溢出效应在跨国公司战略选择中的作用，特别关注具有溢出预防成本的内生FDI溢出效应。在讨论了外生溢出情况后，本文证明了在二次溢出预防成本函数下，fdi企业可以选择一个正向的溢出水平，并给出了这种最优溢出的决定因素。作为外国直接投资东道国的一项政府政策，通过对在国企业的利润征税，并利用税收来补贴从事外国直接投资的企业，可以诱导更多的外国直接投资溢出。作为模型的扩展，本文探讨了一个非直接投资的企业案例，结果表明，当国内企业数量趋于无穷大时，外商直接投资条件收敛于外生溢出条件，而外商直接投资对外国企业的成本劣势消失。JEL分类：F12、F23、O33。
This paper aims to explore the role of spillovers in the strategic choice for a MNE in a duopoly model, especially focusing on endogenous FDI spillovers with spillover-prevention costs. After discussing the exogenous spillover case, this paper shows that with a quadratic spillover-prevention cost function, the FDI-performing firm may choose a positive level of spillovers, and also shows the determinants of such optimal spillovers. As a government policy of FDI host country, this paper shows that it may induce more FDI spillovers by taxing on the profits of the firm in the country and by using the tax revenue to subsidize the FDI-performing firm. As an extension of the model, this paper explores a n FDI-performing firm case, and shows that as the number of the home firms goes infinity, the FDI condition converges to that with exogenous spillovers while the cost disadvantage to the foreign firm disappears in case of FDI. JEL Classification: F12, F23, O33.