The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis
The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.02.002
复制
发表时间：
2013-06-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
De Smedt, Johan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
De Cruz, Helen;De Smedt, Johan
认识上的同行分歧提出了有趣的问题，无论是在认识论和科学哲学。什么时候听从别人的意见是合理的，什么时候我们应该坚持我们最初的信念？我们能从一个认知同伴不同意我们的事实中学到什么？在这些辩论中，一个相对较少关注的问题是，认知同伴分歧的价值能否帮助我们进一步实现认知目标，如果是，如何帮助？我们通过古人类学中最近的一个案例来调查这一点：关于弗洛雷斯人分类地位的争论仍然没有解决，一些作者认为化石代表了一种新的人类物种，另一些人则声称他们是先天性生长障碍的智人。我们在最近的科学史上对这种情况的研究提供了对同行分歧价值的见解，表明如果一个人不直接听从同行的结论，但仍然对同行的证据和论点持开放态度，这是特别有价值的。(C)2013爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer's conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer's evidence and arguments. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.