Collateral, Credit History, and the Financial Decelerator
Collateral, Credit History, and the Financial Decelerator
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抵押品、信用记录和金融减速器
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.839964
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ronel Elul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ronel Elul
作者开发了一个简单的模型，在该模型中，金融缺陷可以稳定总体波动，而不仅仅是像以前的许多文献那样加剧波动；作者将此称为金融减速器。在模型中，代理人借钱购买住房，并用这种长期资产来担保他们的贷款。该模型存在两个财务缺陷。首先，代理商无法承诺偿还贷款？也就是说，他们可以战略性地违约。这限制了贷方愿意提供的金额。然而，此外，贷款人对于借款人的违约倾向也了解不充分；也就是说，存在逆向选择。后一种缺陷意味着违约实际上可能在均衡时发生，这与之前的许多文献不同。对于相对较高的房价，承诺问题确保了均衡的典型特征是标准的金融加速器；也就是说，随着价格下跌，代理人可以用来抵押未来贷款的财富减少，防止违约的借贷限制变得更加严格，从而加剧了总体波动。然而，Elul 表明，当价格非常低时，代理商会违约，这是一种稳定力量；他将此称为金融减速器。 ;同时作为支付卡中心讨论文件第 05-14 号发布
The author develops a simple model in which financial imperfections can serve to stabilize aggregate fluctuations and not merely aggravate them as in much of the previous literature; the author terms this a financial decelerator. In the model agents borrow to purchase housing and secure their loans with this long-lived asset. There are two financial imperfections in this model. First, agents are unable to commit to repay their loans ? that is, they can strategically default. This limits the amount that lenders are willing to offer. In addition, however, lenders are also imperfectly informed as to a borrower?s propensity to default; that is, there is adverse selection. The latter imperfection implies that default may actually occur in equilibrium, unlike in much of the previous literature. For relatively high house prices the commitment problem ensures that the equilibrium is typically characterized by a standard financial accelerator; that is, the borrowing constraints which prevent default become tighter as falling prices reduce the wealth with which agents can collateralize future loans, thereby exacerbating aggregate fluctuations. However, Elul shows that when prices are very low, agents will default, which serves as a stabilizing force; he terms this a financial decelerator. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 05-14