Designing Buyback Contracts for Irrational but Predictable Newsvendors
Designing Buyback Contracts for Irrational but Predictable Newsvendors
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1567614
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发表时间：
2011-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Michael Becker‐Peth;Elena Katok;U. W. Thonemann
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作者：
Michael Becker‐Peth;Elena Katok;U. W. Thonemann
在设计供应合同的研究中，一个主要的假设是决策者以最大化其预期利润的方式行事。许多实验室实验表明，这一假设并不成立。具体而言，面对不确定的需求，决策者下订单，系统地偏离预期的利润最大化水平。我们通过证明订购决策也系统地依赖于单个合同参数，并通过开发捕获这种系统行为的行为模型，来补充这一知识体系。我们继续使用实验室实验来测试我们的行为模型，并使用这些数据来推导经验模型参数。然后，我们测试我们的方法在样本验证实验，证实，的确，使用行为模型设计的合同比使用标准模型设计的合同表现更好。这篇论文被运营管理部的Christian Terwiesch接受。
One of the main assumptions in research on designing supply contracts is that decision makers act in a way that maximizes their expected profit. A number of laboratory experiments demonstrate that this assumption does not hold. Specifically, faced with uncertain demand, decision makers place orders that systematically deviate from the expected profit maximizing levels. We have added to this body of knowledge by demonstrating that ordering decisions also systematically depend on individual contract parameters and by developing a behavioral model that captures this systematic behavior. We proceed to test our behavioral model using laboratory experiments and use the data to derive empirical model parameters. We then test our approach in out-of-sample validation experiments that confirm that, indeed, contracts designed using the behavioral model perform better than contracts designed using the standard model. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations management.