On the Profitability of Media Mergers
On the Profitability of Media Mergers
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论媒体并购的盈利能力
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anthony J. Dukes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Esther Gal‐Or;Anthony J. Dukes
我们研究商业媒体行业非合并横向合并的动机。在一个模型与差异化的媒体和产品，我们表明，这样的合并是有利可图的，如果合并媒体公司获得相对议价优势，相对于广告商在谈判中的广告空间。议价优势是否能为合并创造有利条件，取决于媒体公司之间争夺受众的程度。更高水平的竞争使媒体合并更有利可图。这一结果与传统产品市场的寡头垄断模型所暗示的结果形成鲜明对比，后者表明，随着竞争水平的提高，合并的利润会降低。
We examine incentives for nonconsolidating horizontal mergers in commercial media industries. In a model with differentiated media and products, we show that such a merger is profitable if merging media firms gain a relative bargaining advantage vis-a-vis advertisers in the negotiations for advertising space. Whether a bargaining advantage yields profitable conditions for a merger depends on the extent of competition for audiences among media firms. Higher levels of competition make media mergers more profitable. This result contrasts those implied by oligopoly models for traditional product markets, which suggest that mergers become less profitable for higher levels of competition.