Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples
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DOI：
10.1109/90.993302
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发表时间：
2002-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xi-Ren Cao;Hongxia Shen;R. Milito;P. Wirth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xi-Ren Cao;Hongxia Shen;R. Milito;P. Wirth
回顾了博弈论的三个分支，领导者-跟随者博弈、合作博弈和两人非零和博弈的基本概念，并将其应用于互联网定价问题的研究。我们特别强调，合作博弈(也称为讨价还价问题)为问题提供了一个总体情况。通过一个简单的互联网服务质量模型，我们证明了领导者-追随者博弈可能导致非帕累托最优解，在某些情况下可能是“不公平的”，合作博弈可能为互联网服务提供商和用户提供更好的解决方案。这一结果的实际含义是，政府监管或仲裁可能会有所帮助。并应用服务质量模型研究了两个运营商之间的竞争，发现了一个纳什均衡点，即两个运营商在没有合作的情况下不会退出。所提出的方法也可应用于其他互联网定价问题，如巴黎地铁定价方案。
The basic concepts of three branches of game theory, leader-follower, cooperative, and two-person nonzero sum games, are reviewed and applied to the study of the Internet pricing issue. In particular, we emphasize that the cooperative game (also called the bargaining problem) provides an overall picture for the issue. With a simple model for Internet quality of service (QoS), we demonstrate that the leader-follower game may lead to a solution that is not Pareto optimal and in some cases may be "unfair," and that the cooperative game may provide a better solution for both the Internet service provider (ISP) and the user. The practical implication of the results is that government regulation or arbitration may be helpful. The QoS model is also applied to study the competition between two ISPs, and we find a Nash equilibrium point from which the two ISPs would not move out without cooperation. The proposed approaches can be applied to other Internet pricing problems such as the Paris Metro pricing scheme.