FAIR CHANCE AND MODAL CONSEQUENTIALISM
FAIR CHANCE AND MODAL CONSEQUENTIALISM
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DOI：
10.1017/s0266267115000152
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发表时间：
2015-11-01
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Stefansson, H. Orri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stefansson, H. Orri
本文发展了一个多维决策理论，并认为它比经典决策理论更好地捕捉了关于机会公平分配的普通直觉。该理论是理查德·杰弗里的决策理论对反事实前景的延伸，是模态后果主义的一种形式，根据该理论，实际结果的价值往往取决于可能发生的事情。与现有的模态结果主义不同，多维决策理论允许我们明确地对实际结果和反事实结果之间的可验证依赖关系进行建模，我认为，这是关于机会公平分配的常见直觉的核心。
This paper develops a Multidimensional Decision Theory and argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution of chances than classical decision theory. The theory is an extension of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospect and is a form of Modal Consequentialism, according to which the value of actual outcomes often depends on what could have been. Unlike existing versions of modal consequentialism, the multidimensional decision theory allows us to explicitly model the desirabilistic dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes that, I contend, are at the heart of common intuitions about fair distribution of chances.