Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption
Democracy and Deceit: Regulating Appearances of Corruption
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民主与欺骗：规范腐败现象
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Mark E Warren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mark E Warren
虽然腐败长期以来一直被认为是适当的监管对象，但对腐败现象的担忧是最近才开始的，恰逢20世纪60年代中后期人们对政府的信任度下降。然而，支持表象规则的理由仍然是有缺陷的，因为它依赖于一种公众信任的公共服务模式，这种模式在应用于政治代表时是不完整的，而且经常错位。然而，从民主理论的角度来看，监管外表的理由是明确的。民主的代表制度依赖于外表的正直，这不仅仅是因为它们表明政治代表是否维护了他们的公众信任，而且因为它们提供了一种手段，公民可以通过这些手段来判断在特定情况下是否有必要信任他们。未能支持公众对外表的信心的代表、机构和伦理剥夺了公民的权力，剥夺了他们参与公开审判的手段。这些失败相当于民主进程的腐败。
While corruption has long been recognized as an appropriate object of regulation, concern with appearances of corruption is of recent origin, coinciding with declining trust in government in the mid- to late-1960s. The reasoning that would support regulations of appearances, however, remains flawed, as it depends upon a “public trust” model of public service that is incomplete and often misplaced when applied to political representatives. The justification for regulating appearances is unambiguous, however, from the perspective of democratic theory. Democratic institutions of representation depend upon the integrity of appearances, not simply because they are an indication of whether political representatives are upholding their public trust, but because they provide the means through which citizens can judge whether, in particular instances, their trust is warranted. Representatives, institutions, and ethics that fail to support public confidence in appearances disempower citizens by denying them the means for inclusion in public judgments. These failures amount to a corruption of democratic processes.