Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination
Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination
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作为政策工具的贸易制裁：重新审视
DOI：
10.2307/2600674
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发表时间：
1986
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
J. Lindsay
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Lindsay
大多数关于贸易制裁的研究都考察了制裁在迫使目标国改变政策方面的成功。本文从一系列更广泛的目标来分析制裁的成功：遵守、颠覆、威慑、国际象征和国内象征。我检查了19个制裁案例，对每个目标使用不同的评估标准。分析得出三个结果。首先，当制裁的目标是顺从、颠覆或威慑时，制裁通常会失败，但作为国际和国内的象征，制裁具有巨大的吸引力。第二，制裁往往会强化目标的行为，并丧失发起者未来对目标的经济影响力。第三，国际和国内象征主义的目标通常会破坏遵守和颠覆的目标。
Most studies of trade sanctions examine the success of sanctions at forcing the target country to change its policies. This article analyzes the success of sanctions in terms of a broader set of goals: compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. I examine 19 sanctions cases using different evaluatory criteria for each goal. Three results emerge from the analysis. First, sanctions generally fail when the goal is compliance, subversion, or deterrence, but they have a great appeal as international and domestic symbols. Second, sanctions often reinforce the target's behavior and forfeit the initiator's future economic leverage over the target. Third, the goals of international and domestic symbolism usually undermine the goals of compliance and subversion.