Kant and Global Poverty: Guest Editors' Introduction to Special Issue
Kant and Global Poverty: Guest Editors' Introduction to Special Issue
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康德与全球贫困:客座编辑特刊简介
DOI:
10.1007/s10677-023-10392-2
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发表时间:
2023
影响因子:
1
通讯作者:
Mieth C
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Mieth C
What duties do wealthy people have towards those living in poverty, in their own country or abroad? What duties do better-off people have towards those afflicted by life-threatening emergencies, such as starvation, epidemics and war? For anyone living in relative comfort, these questions are familiar, if uncomfortable. Two familiar answers are rooted in our duties to help others where we can. The more comforting answer sees these duties as individual requirements of charity. They are optional aspects of virtue, weak or supererogatory. A more uncomfortable view sees them as stringent duties to aid or rescue. 1Kantian analyses of poverty agree that better-off people have duties to help others. But they also stress how limiting this focus can be. The moral concern of the better-off tends to figure poor people as needy recipients. A more adequate approach must recognise those living in poverty as agents and rights-holders. It must raise broader questions about the oppression and domination that exclude people from material resources. As Narayan (2000) puts it, poverty is also “powerlessness and voicelessness.” Kant himself frames duties of beneficence as “imperfect.” This is not because they are weak or unimportant. Rather, they do not directly guide action, at least in most contexts. The content of these duties depends greatly on someone’s specific situation and the needs