Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News
Playing Favorites: How Firms Prevent the Revelation of Bad News
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偏袒：企业如何防止坏消息的披露
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2479542
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christopher J. Malloy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lauren Cohen;Dong Lou;Christopher J. Malloy
我们探讨了一个微妙的，但重要的机制，通过该机制，企业可以控制信息流到市场。我们发现，那些通过不成比例地召集看涨分析师来“铸造”电话会议的公司，往往在未来表现不佳。那些对分析师评价更高的公司，其未来盈利的意外性更大，未来盈利的重述也更多。利用这种差异性的公司行为的多空投资组合每月获得高达149个基点的异常回报，或每年近18%。我们在来自英国、加拿大、法国和日本的收益电话会议记录的国际样本中发现了类似的证据。具有较高可支配应计利润的公司，几乎没有达到/超过盈利预期的公司，以及即将发行股票，出售股票和行使期权的公司（及其高管），都更有可能发布他们的盈利电话。
We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long-short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month, or almost 18 percent per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the UK, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options, are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls.