Contracts as entry barriers for unlicensed spectrum
Contracts as entry barriers for unlicensed spectrum
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合同作为未授权频谱的进入壁垒
DOI：
10.1109/infcomw.2017.8116484
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Berry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yining Zhu;R. Berry
更多的未经许可的频谱接入有可能加剧无线服务提供商之间的竞争，并通过降低进入壁垒鼓励创新。然而，在这种频段内提供服务的早期提供商可能会通过使用对转向新提供商的客户施加罚款的合同来制造新的进入壁垒。本文讨论了在进入者进入无牌频谱市场之前可能签订排他性或非排他性合同的情况。我们的研究结果表明，现有企业总是会提供排他性合同，这将增加预期的客户剩余。预期的社会福利可能会增加或减少，这取决于我们如何对客户需求进行建模，以及现有企业和进入企业的技术。
Greater unlicensed access to spectrum has the potential to increase competition among wireless service providers and encourage innovations by lowering barriers to entry. However, early providers offering service in such a band could create new entry barriers through the use of contracts that impose a penalty on customers who switch to a new provider. This paper discusses cases in which an exclusive or non-exclusive contract may be signed before entrants come into an unlicensed spectrum market. Our results indicate that the incumbents will always offer an exclusive contract, which would increase the expected customer surplus. The expected social welfare may increase or decrease depending on how we model the customers' demand, and the technology of the incumbents and entrants.