Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
复制标题
DOI：
10.2307/2946692
复制
发表时间：
1995-08
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
T. Piketty
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Piketty
就像经济学家一样，选民们对再分配税收有着相互矛盾的看法，因为他们对税收激励成本的估计不同。我们的模型理性代理人试图从他们的王朝收入流动性的经验，努力和预定因素的相对重要性，在收入不平等的产生，因此这些激励成本的大小学习。从长远来看，“左翼王朝”不太相信个人努力，投票支持更多的再分配，与“右翼王朝”共存。“这使我们能够解释为什么个人的流动性经验，而不仅仅是当前的收入对政治态度很重要，以及对社会流动性的看法的持续差异如何在国家之间产生持续的再分配差异。
Just like economists, voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently. We model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs. In the long run, "left-wing dynasties" believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with "right-wing dynasties." This allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries.