Financing with Convertible Preferred Stock, 1960-1967: Reply
Financing with Convertible Preferred Stock, 1960-1967: Reply
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可转换优先股融资，1960 年至 1967 年：回复
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00598.x
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发表时间：
1971
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. E. Pinches
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. E. Pinches
Jerry J. Weygandt 和 Ronald W. Melicher 的评论提供了重新审视原始研究中得出的结论的机会。然而，在重新审查之前，我想简要评论一下 Melicher 提供的非常有趣的数据。在研究了 19601968 年期间发生的 258 起大型公司合并后，梅利彻得出结论（正如我所做的那样），近年来可转换优先股的主要用途是为公司合并和收购融资。由于需要保持平衡的资本结构，Melicher还建议在未来的企业并购融资中将继续采用可转换优先股。韦甘特认为，最近会计惯例的变化将导致可转换优先股作为企业合并融资工具的消失。具体来说，他认为以下结论是无效的——“……没有任何迹象表明公司会减少使用可转换优先股来为一些被视为‘利益池’的免税合并融资。 “12 Weygandt 引用的原因是：(1) 企业合并会计处理的变化； (2) 与披露完全稀释每股收益相关的会计变更。会计原则委员会关于企业合并的第 16 号意见3指出，如果在合并或收购会计中采用“利益结合”，则需要更严格的要求。这些变化似乎具有在采用“利益联合”时消除可转换优先股的使用的效果。因此，企业合并会计处理的这一变化将直接影响可转换优先股在企业合并融资中的使用。 （Weygandt 实际上指出了一个参数的变化，该参数在我的研究完成时被假定为固定的。）Weygandt 的第二点是，报告完全稀释的每股收益使任何收益杠杆无效；因此，会计数据的相关方“不会被误导而假设人为的盈利杠杆。”4我个人认为，报告完全稀释每股收益本身对企业合并所采用的融资几乎没有直接影响。在这方面，Melicher 1969年的初步调查结果似乎与Weygandt相矛盾，因为在这些合并发生之前就可以获得完全稀释每股收益的数据。5不幸的是，不可能确定报告完全稀释每股收益对合并融资的影响，因为企业合并的会计方法有
THE COMMENTs by Jerry J. Weygandt and Ronald W. Melicher provide an opportunity to re-examine the conclusions arrived at in the original study.' Before that re-examination, however, I would like to comment briefly on the very interesting data presented by Melicher. After examining 258 large corporate mergers occurring during the 19601968 time period, Melicher concludes (as I did) that the main usage of convertible preferred stock in recent years was in financing corporate mergers and acquisitions. Because of the need to maintain a balanced capital structure, Melicher also suggests that convertible preferred stock will continue to be employed in future corporate merger financing. Weygandt believes that recent changes in accounting conventions will cause convertible preferred stock to disappear as a financing vehicle for corporate mergers. Specifically, he contends that the following conclusion is invalid-". . . there is nothing to suggest that companies will lessen their usage of convertible preferred in financing some non-taxable mergers that are accounted for as a 'pooling of interests.' "12 The reasons cited by Weygandt are: (1) changes in accounting for business combinations; and (2) accounting changes relevant to the disclosure of fully diluted earnings per share. Opinion number 16 on business combinations by the Accounting Principles Board3 indicates that more restrictive requirements will be required if "pooling of interests" is to be employed in accounting for a merger or acquisition. These changes appear to have the effect of eliminating the use of convertible preferred stock when "pooling of interests" is employed. Accordingly, this change in accounting for business combinations will directly affect the usage of convertible preferred stock in financing corporate mergers. (Weygandt, in effect, is pointing out a change in a parameter which was assumed fixed when my study was completed.) Weygandt's second point is that the reporting of fully diluted earnings per share nullifies any earnings leverage; therefore, interested parties of accounting data 'will not be misled into assuming factitious earnings leverage."4 I personally believe the reporting of fully diluted earnings per share, by itself, will have little direct effect on the financing employed for business combinations. In this respect Melicher's preliminary findings for 1969 seem to contradict Weygandt, since data on fully diluted earnings per share were available before these mergers occurred.5 Unfortunately, it will be impossible to determine the effect of reporting fully diluted earnings per share on merger financing, since the method of accounting for business combinations has