Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements
Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements
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规模不平等、协调外部性和国际贸易协定
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.05.006
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kamal Saggi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Limão;Kamal Saggi
发展中国家现在占世界贸易的很大一部分，占世界贸易组织（世贸组织）成员的三分之二。然而，许多国家的规模仍然很小，因此在双边关系中从较大的发达经济体获得和执行贸易让步方面的能力有限，尽管它们作为一个整体有能力这样做。我们表明，这种协调外部性在依赖双边贸易报复威胁的协议（如WTO）下产生不对称的结果，而在扩展到包括某些金融工具的协议下则不会产生不对称的结果。特别是，我们发现，如果延长的协议包括交易前的债券交换，那么它会改善全球效率和公平，但如果它只依赖于事后罚款，则不会。此外，即使小国受到财政限制而无法发行债券，债券和罚款的结合也会产生类似的改善。
Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two-thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation – such as the WTO – but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds.