A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY
A COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WORKER REPLACEMENT AND WAGE RIGIDITY
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工人替代和工资刚性的竞争模式
DOI：
10.1111/ecin.12110
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Snell A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Snell A
我们采用 Menzio 和 Moen (2010) 以及 Snell 和 Thomas (2010) 的模型来考虑劳动力市场，在这个市场中，企业可以承诺工资合同，但不能承诺不替换现有工人。工人厌恶风险，因此公司有动力平滑工资。实际工资以高度非线性的方式对冲击作出反应，表现出向下刚性，并放大了失业对负面冲击的反应。我们还考虑了裁员，并表明在一系列冲击下，工资削减时会出现劳动力囤积现象。我们认为这些特征与最近的证据是一致的。 （JELE32、J41）
We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labor market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly nonlinear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence. (JELE32, J41)