On the effectiveness of meta-detection for countering oracle attacks in watermarking
On the effectiveness of meta-detection for countering oracle attacks in watermarking
复制标题
水印中元检测对抗预言机攻击的有效性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Barni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Tondi;Pedro Comesaña Alfaro;F. Pérez;M. Barni
我们评估智能元检测的性能，以打击预言攻击的水印。在最近的工作中，我们已经表明，很少的查询是足够的一个简单的元检测器（即，元检测器的基础上的查询的水印检测边界的接近度），以检测一个预言攻击。我们先前分析的一个局限性是假设所有查询都对应于诚实用户或恶意用户。在本文中，我们解决了一个更现实的情况下，诚实的查询穿插来自一个Oracle攻击的查询。通过专注于这种更普遍的情况下，我们评估的元检测的性能和条件下，强大的测试是可能的。
We evaluate the performance of smart metadetection as a way to combat oracle attacks in watermarking. In a recent work, we have shown that few queries are sufficient for a simple metadetector (namely, a metadetector based on the closeness of queries to the watermark detection boundary) to detect an oracle attack. A limitation of our prior analysis is the assumption that all the queries correspond to either honest users or malicious ones. In this paper, we address a more realistic scenario in which honest queries are interspersed with queries derived from an oracle attack. By focusing on this more general situation, we evaluate the performance of the metadetection and derive conditions under which powerful testing is possible.